PROOFS: Security Proofs for Embedded Systems

Program
Friday August 19, 2016 | |
20:10 – 22:00 | Welcome dinner in Santa Barbara (more details below) |
Saturday August 20, 2016 | |
08:20 – 08:40 | Registration (at University Center Corwin Pavilion Lobby, same place as registration for CRYPTO, FDTC, CHES) |
08:40 – 08:50 | Opening (University Center Flying A Studios) (Presentation slides 1, Presentation slides 2) |
08:50 – 09:35 | Invited Talk 1
Chair: Naofumi Homma
|
09:35 – 10:35 | First session: Side-channel attacks
Chair: Naofumi Homma
|
10:35 – 11:00 | Coffee break |
11:00 – 12:00 | Second session: Fault injection attacks
Chair: Jean-Luc Danger
|
12:00 – 13:20 | Lunch (University Center Lagoon Patio) |
13:20 – 14:05 | Invited Talk 2 Chair: Sylvain Guilley |
14:05 – 15:05 | Third session: Formal analysis
Chair: Sylvain Guilley
|
15:05 – 15:15 | Closing (Presentation slides) |
Two keynote talks:
- Yuval Yarom, The University of Adelaide, Australia.
- Title: Thwarting cache-based side-channel attacks
- Abstract: Cache-based side-channel attacks leak sensitive information through a shared cache. The attacker exploits contention on the cache to trace the victim's access to memory. These traces leak information on the data the victim processes, and have been used to recover the keys of various cryptographic primitives, including AES, RSA, ElGamal, DSA and ECDSA. Cache-based attacks have proven effective in bypassing the boundaries between sandboxes, processes, containers and virtual-machines. With the shift to cloud environments, countermeasures for cache-based attack are more important than ever. In this presentation we will explore cache-based side-channel attacks. We will analyse the causes of leaks and will look at countermeasures at both the software and the operating system levels.
- Ryan Kastner, UCSD, USA.
- Title: Moving Hardware from “Security through Obscurity” to “Secure by Design”
- Abstract:
It is a difficult, perhaps impossible, task to design modern hardware that is impervious to any and every attack. It is hard to insure that these complex, multi-billion transistor systems are functionally correct, let alone secure. Yet, for the most part, computing system designers assume that the hardware is secure and focus their security efforts at higher levels of abstraction (OS, programming language, algorithm, etc.). Recent attacks have shown this is a false premise, and building upon an insecure foundation is a recipe for disaster.
In this talk, we discuss techniques that enable the designer to reason about hardware security. These techniques are based upon information flow and information theoretic measures. They are oblivious to the types of variables under consideration. Thus, we can assess both functional security properties related to confidentiality and integrity as well as covert channels. Our techniques enable the characterization of portions of the system that are potentially vulnerable to attacks. And they determine the effectiveness of mitigation techniques on the overall security of the system. The end result is more secure hardware, which leads to safer and more secure computing systems.
Bio: http://kastner.ucsd.edu/ryan/about-me/
Contributed talks:
- See list of accepted papers.
Welcome dinner, on Friday Aug. 19th:

- Opal restaurant (website: http://opalrestaurantandbar.com)
- Address and location:
- 1325 State Street, Santa Barbara CA 93101
- Tel: 805 966 9676
- Dinner starts at 8:10pm
- Four choices of main courses — see this PDF
-
Transportation from UCSB:
- Santa Barbara MTD Bus, No 24x leaves at 5:10, 5:24, 5:59, 6:34, 7:24, and 7:58.
- It takes 20 min to get to downtown Transit center.
- You need to walk 5 min to Opal.
- The Bus arrives at Chapala Street, parallel to State Street.
- On State Street walk towards mountains 2.5 blocks.
- Map with directions